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We explore a range of issues concerning the gender gap in workplace author- 
it.y in seven countries (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Aus- 
tralia, Sweden, Norway, and Japan). There are six main empirical conclu- 
sions. First, there is considerable cross-national variation in the gender gap 
in authority: The gap is lowest in the four English-speaking countries (espe- 
cially the United States and Australia) and highest in Japan. Second, the 
gender gap in auth0rit.y within countries and the pattern of cross-national 
variation do not appear to be the result of gender differences in personal 
attributes or employment settings. Third, the self-selection hypothesis (that 
women choose not to seek authority because of family responsibilities) does 
not appear to account for much of the gender gap in authority, except per- 
haps in Canada. Fourth, we find little support for the "glass-ceiling " hypoth-
esis that barriers to upward promotions for women in authority hierarchies 
are greater than the barriers they face in getting into hierarchies in the first 
place. Fifth, in the United States the barriers faced by women alread.y in 
hierarchies are weaker than in other countries, and probably weaker than the 
barriers they faced to enter hierarchies in the first place. fin all.^, we find 
suggestive evidence that these variations across countries in the gender gap 
in authority are explained by the interaction between the availability of mana- 
gerial positions and the capacity ofpolitically organized women's movements 
to challenge barriers to women gaining auth0rit.y in the workplace. 
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then gender inequality in workplace author- 
ity becomes a key institutional element in the 
reproduction of gender inequality throughout 
work organizations. 
Of course, no one is surprised by the fact 
that workplace authority is unequally distrib- 
uted between men and women in all of the 
countries we examine. What may be surpris- 
ing, however, is the pattern of cross-national 
variation in the gender gap in authority. To 
take just one example, in the United States 
the probability of a man in the labor force 
occupying an "upper" or "top" management 
position is 1.8 times greater than the prob- 
ability of a woman occupying such a posi- 
tion, whereas in Sweden, the probability for 
men is 4.2 times greater than that for women. 
These results may seem counterintuitive, 
since in many respects gender relations are 
more  egalitarian in Sweden than in the 
United States: The wage differential between 
men and women is much lower in Sweden;' 
husbands, on average, perform a somewhat 
higher proportion of h o u~ ewo r k ; ~  and gender 
attitudes are significantly more egalitarian in 
Sweden than in the United state^.^ Neverthe-
less, the gender gap in workplace authority 
is considerably greater in Sweden than in the 
United States. 
In this paper, we document and attempt to 
explain these kinds of cross-national varia- 
tions in gender inequality in workplace au- 
thority in seven developed, capitalist coun- 
tries-the United States, Canada, the United 
In Sweden in the late 1980s, women's hourly 
earnings were roughly 91 percent those of men, 
whereas in the United States the figure was about 
65 percent (National Committee on Pay Equity 
1988). 
Wright et al. (1992) reported that in two- 
earner households, the average Swedish man does 
about 25 percent of the total housework, whereas 
in the United States the figure is only 20 percent. 
Furthermore, in families in which the wife works 
40 hours a week in the paid labor force, the fig- 
ure in Sweden is nearly 40 percent whereas in the 
United States it is still about 20 percent. 
In our data, 57.1 percent of Americans com- 
pared to 74.1 percent of Swedes agree (somewhat 
or strongly) with the statement "Ideally there 
should be as many women as men in important 
positions in government and business." For a dis- 
cussion of gender attitudes in Sweden and the 
United States, see Baxter and Kane (forthcom- 
ing). 
Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Norway, and 
Japan. More specifically, we attempt to as- 
sess the extent to which the gender gap in 
authority within these countries and the 
variations in the gap across countries can be 
attributed to discrimination against women. 
While some limited research on gender in- 
equalities and discrimination in the distribu- 
tion of authority exists (Wolf and Fligstein 
1979a, 1979b; Hill 1980; Grandjean 1981; 
Rosenbaum 1984; Diprete and Soule 1988; 
Jaffee 1989; Jacobs, 1989, 1992; Reskin and 
Roos 1992; McGuire and Reskin 1993), we 
know of no quantitative research that system- 
atically explores this problem in a broad 
comparative context. 
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
Several familiar factors may make women 
less likely than men to occupy workplace po- 
sitions involving authority. Gender differ- 
ences in aspirations and occupational prefer- 
ences, partially a result of socialization pro- 
cesses and partially of adaptive preference 
formation, may lead women to select them- 
selves out of the running for authority posi- 
tions. Gender differences in various kinds of 
individual attributes, especially specialized 
training and labor market experience, may 
make women less qualified for managerial 
jobs. Gender differences in employment set- 
tings-sectors, size of employing organiza- 
tion, state versus private employers, part-time 
work-may affect the opportunities for pro- 
motion into positions of authority. And, of 
course, active gender discrimination may 
simply make it harder for qualified women to 
be promoted. The beliefs and motives of ac- 
tors engaged in discrimination can take many 
different forms: a commitment to norms bar- 
ring women from exercising authority over 
men (Kanter 1977; Bergman 1986), stereo- 
typed beliefs that women are too emotional 
to be effective managers (Kanter 1977; 
Reskin and Hartman 1986), belief in the effi- 
ciency of "statistical discrimination" (Wolf 
and Fligstein 1979a; Bielby and Baron 1986), 
or simply the desire to preserve men's power 
and privileges (Reskin 1988; Acker 1990). 
Regardless of the underlying motives, dis- 
crimination affects the relative chances of 
men and women to occupy positions of au- 
thority, either because it affects access to the 
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social networks and personal interactions that 
facilitate promotions, or because people in 
positions of higher authority directly dis- 
criminate against women in their allocation 
of people to positions of authority. 
The ideal data for analyzing gender dis- 
crimination in access to authority would in- 
clude direct observations of the discrimina- 
tory acts that cumulatively shape the out- 
comes. Since such data are never available 
in systematic, quantifiable form, research on 
gender inequalities in labor market outcomes 
typically relies on indirect methods of as-
sessing discrimination. Two principal strate- 
gies have been adopted. In the first, which 
can be called the "net gender gap approach," 
a multivariate equation predicting workplace 
authority is estimated in which the indepen- 
dent variables include gender plus a series of 
control variables thought to represent various 
nondiscrimination effects on authority (e.g., 
education or job experience). A significant 
coefficient for the gender variable in this 
equation is then taken as an indicator of the 
degree of likely discrimination in the direct 
allocation of workplace authority. Active, di- 
rect discrimination in the allocation of au- 
thority is thus treated as the "residual expla- 
nation" when other nondiscrimination expla- 
nations (represented by the control variables 
in the equation) fail to fully account for gen- 
der differences in authority. Of course, even 
if the gender coefficient were zero, this 
would not prove that discrimination is absent 
from the social processes generating overall 
gender differences in authority, since dis- 
crimination could systematically affect the 
control variables themselves. The net gender 
gap strategy, therefore, is effective only in 
assessing the extent to which discrimination 
operates directly in the process of allocating 
authority within organization^.^ 
The net gender gap strategy of analysis is 
always vulnerable, either because of possible 
misspecifications of the equation (important 
nondiscrimination causes of the gender gap 
are excluded from the analysis) or because 
This approach resembles the strategy fre- 
quently used to study racial discrimination (Beck, 
Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Featherman and Hauser 
1978) or gender discrimination in earnings 
(Treiman and Roos 1983; Rosenfeld and Kalle- 
berg 1990). 
of poor measurement of some of the vari- 
ables. What looks like a residual "discrimi- 
nation" gap, therefore, may simply reflect 
limitations in the data analysis. Nevertheless, 
if the gender gap in authority remains large 
after controlling for a variety of plausible 
factors, then this adds credibility to the claim 
that direct discrimination exists in the pro- 
cess by which authority is allocated. Versions 
of this approach to analyzing the gender gap 
in authority were adopted by Wolf and Flig- 
stein (1979b), Jaffee (1989), and Reskin and 
Roos (1992). In all of these studies, a sig- 
nificant net gender gap in authority remains 
after extensive sets of controls were included 
in the e q u a t i ~ n . ~  
The second strategy for indirectly assess- 
ing the role of discrimination in generating 
gender differences in authority can be called 
the "gender interaction approach." In this 
strategy, separate multivariate equations pre- 
dicting authority are estimated for men and 
women. Gender differences in the slopes of 
key variables are then interpreted as reflect- 
ing likely discrimination. The key idea here 
is that discrimination does not simply have 
additive effects on outcomes; it also affects 
the relative success with which women can 
convert various relevant individual attributes 
into authority. Thus, for example, Wolf and 
Fligstein (1979a), in the earliest quantitative 
modeling of gender differences in authority, 
observed that men get significantly higher 
authority returns to education than do  
women, even after controlling for variables 
like age and work experience. In general, re- 
search using this strategy has found that 
more of the overall difference in authority 
between men and women can be attributed 
to differences in the authority returns to fac- 
tors like education or experience than to dif- 
ferences in the means between men and 
Wolf and Fligstein (1979b) control for educa- 
tion, experience, and tenure; Jaffe (1989) controls 
for SEI, education, marital status, children, work 
experience, race, age, and the sex composition of 
three-digit-code occupations; Reskin and Roos 
(1992), predicting the number of arenas of final 
decision-making among managers, control for 
education, firm tenure, hours worked, self-em- 
ployment, organization size, managerial level, su- 
pervisory authority, percentage female in occupa- 
tions, and census-designated managerial occupa- 
tion. 
women on these determinants of authority 
(Halaby 1979; Hill 1980; McGuire and 
Reskin 1993). 
In the present research, we adopt the net 
gender gap strategy for two reasons. First, 
since our main concern is with cross-national 
comparisons, the gender-interaction ap-
proach would involve the analysis of three- 
way interaction terms (country x gender x 
independent variable). Because of our rela- 
tively small sample sizes, the standard errors 
of three-way interaction coefficients are typi- 
cally large, even when quite large nominal 
differences appear across countries in the 
size of gender interactions. In all of the doz- 
ens of possible country contrasts in gender 
interactions in our data, only a few three-way 
interactions even approached conventional 
criteria for statistical significance. Second, 
with seven countries and a large array of in- 
dependent variables, the gender-interaction 
approach becomes extremely complicated 
conceptually. Since this is the first cross-na- 
tional analysis of the gender gap in author- 
ity, it seemed desirable to adopt the simpler 
net gender gap approach, even though the in- 
teraction approach is a more realistic way to 
conceptualize the process of discrimination. 
EMPIRICAL AGENDA 
The data analysis revolves around four main 
tasks: documenting the cross-national varia- 
tion in the gender gap in authority; diagnos- 
ing the proximate causes of the gender gap 
in having authority within countries; diag- 
nosing the gender gaps in the amount of au-
thority within countries; and exploring a va- 
riety of possible explanations of the cross- 
national variations in net gender gaps. 
Cross-National Patterns in 
the Gender Gap in Authority 
Since there is little publicly available docu- 
mentation of gender differences in authority, 
let alone cross-national variation in these 
differences, before we attempt to explore ex- 
planations of these cross-national variations 
it is important to describe as precisely as 
possible what needs explaining. We use three 
primary measures of authority: sanctioning 
authority (the ability to impose positive or 
negative sanctions on subordinates), deci-
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sion-making authority (direct participation 
in policymaking decisions within an organi- 
zation), and formal position in the authority 
hierarchy. 
Explaining the Gender Gap in 
Having Authority within Countries 
The core idea of the net gender gap approach 
is to specify plausible explanations of gen- 
der differences in authority that do not in- 
volve direct discrimination in promotions 
and then to see if the gap disappears when 
these nondiscrimination factors are held con- 
stant in an equation predicting authority. We 
explore two general explanations of this sort 
of the gender gap in authority: (1) The gen- 
der gap is a result of differences in various 
personal attributes of men and women and of 
differences in their employment settings, and 
(2) the gender gap is a result of self-selec- 
tion by women. 
( I )  Compositional factors. If managers 
and employers make promotion decisions in 
a largely gender-neutral manner in response 
to various observable attributes of potential 
candidates, then the underrepresentation of 
women in hierarchies is largely the result of 
their underrepresentation in the pool of po- 
tential candidates or their possessing less ad- 
equate qualifications than men. For example, 
because it is more efficient for organizations 
to employ full-time managers than part-time 
managers, part-time employees are less 
likely to be in the pool of candidates for ver- 
tical promotions. Since a higher proportion 
of women than men work part time, the over- 
all gender differences in authority could in 
part be the result of the different distributions 
of part-time employment by gender. Of 
course, this fact may itself be partially attrib- 
utable to gender discrimination of various 
sorts. Nevertheless, if the gender gap in au- 
thority disappears after we control for such 
compositional factors, then the gap is un- 
likely to be the result of direct discrimina-
tion in the allocation of authority within the 
employment setting. 
We explore three clusters of compositional 
factors: firm attributes (industrial sector, 
public versus private employment, firm size); 
job attributes (occupation, part-time employ- 
ment, job tenure); and personal attributes 
(age, educaticn, labor force interruptions). 
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To the extent that women are concentrated in 
firms with a low proportion of managers, or 
have job or personal attributes associated 
with low probabilities of managerial promo- 
tions, then once we control for these factors, 
the authority gap between men and women 
should decrease and perhaps even disappear. 
It could be objected that some of these 
compositional factors are in part conse-
quences of discrimination in promotions 
rather than indirect causes of the gender gap. 
For example, women may have shorter aver- 
age job tenure because they have less attach- 
ment to a given employer as a result of ex- 
clusion from promotion possibilities. Exclu- 
sion from positions of authority could thus 
explain some of these compositional factors 
rather than vice versa. We have no way in the 
present data analysis to investigate this pos- 
sibility. Nevertheless, if the inclusion of 
these diverse controls does not significantly 
reduce the gender gap in authority, then this 
adds considerable weight to the claim that 
the gap is to a significant extent the result of 
direct discrimination in the allocation of au- 
thority positions. 
(2) Self-selection because of family re-
sponsibilities. Women in similar employ- 
ment situations to men and with similar per- 
sonal attributes to men may simply not want 
to be promoted into positions of authority as 
frequently as men, particularly because of 
family responsibilities. Given the array of 
feasible alternatives, women may prefer the 
"mommy track" within a career because of 
the reduced pressures and time commitment 
this entails, even though it also results in 
lowered career prospects, especially for ver- 
tical promotion. Again, this is not to deny 
that such preferences may themselves reflect 
the operation of oppressive gender practices 
in society. The gender division of labor in the 
household or the absence of affordable high 
quality childcare, for example, may block the 
options women feel they realistically can 
choose in the workplace. Nevertheless, self- 
selection of this sort is a different mechanism 
from direct discrimination in promotion 
practices. 
Self-selection is especially difficult to 
measure. Unless direct data on the details of 
the promotion practices of employers and the 
career strategies and preferences of employ- 
ees are available, it is hard to rule out self- 
selection as part of the process that generates 
gender differences in outcomes. Neverthe- 
less, we can get some purchase on this prob- 
lem by examining the interactions between 
gender and certain variables likely to be 
closely linked to self-selection. The most of- 
ten cited form of gender self-selection cen- 
ters around the choices women make with 
respect to family responsibilities and paid 
work responsibilities. Therefore, we treat the 
presence of such responsibilities as addi- 
tional "compositional factors." However, un- 
like the simple compositional arguments, 
which are based on additive models of com- 
positional effects, the arguments for self-se- 
lection require an interactive model. For ex- 
ample, the self-selection model claims that 
the presence of children in the household 
leads women to select themselves out of 
competition for authority promotions 
whereas it does not for men. This means that 
in a model predicting authority, the coeffi- 
cient for a measure of the presence of chil- 
dren would be negative for women but zero 
or perhaps positive for men, if the presence 
of children increases the incentive for men 
to seek promotions because of increased fi- 
nancial needs of the family. To assess the 
presence of such self-selection, therefore, we 
have to estimate a model that includes gen- 
der interactions with the self-selection vari- 
ables (as well as the additive compositional 
effects) and then assess the gender gap in au- 
thority at appropriate values for the interact- 
ing independent variables. For this purpose, 
we include three variables that are plausibly 
linked to self-selection: marital status, the 
presence of children in the household, and 
the percentage of housework performed by 
the husband. 
Two objections to this strategy can be 
raised. First, what looks like self-selection 
may really be just another form of discrimi- 
nation and exclusion. The presence of chil- 
dren, for example, may constitute a criterion 
that employers use to assign women to a 
"mommy track" rather than a condition that 
leads women to choose not to compete for 
promotions. We cannot rule out these possi- 
bilities. If the authority gap is significantly 
reduced after controlling for these alleged 
self-selection indicators, we may simply be 
tapping mechanisms through which employ- 
ers deny women promotions. 
Second, as in the case of the additive com- 
positional controls, some of these family-re- 
sponsibility variables may be the partial re-
sult of the relationship of women to author- 
ity. For example, women in positions of au- 
thority may, as a result of increased work 
pressures, do less housework and thus have a 
more egalitarian division of labor in the 
home. Therefore, living in an inegalitarian 
household may not explain why women do 
not have authority, but rather be the result of 
their not having authority. We have no way 
of exploring such reciprocal effects, and thus 
our interpretation of these interaction terms 
must be viewed as tentative. 
The Gender Gap in the Amount of 
Authority within Countries 
One popular image of the problem of work- 
place discrimination is the "glass ceiling": 
although affirmative action and other chal- 
lenges to gender discrimination may have fa- 
cilitated women getting through the door of 
the authority hierarchy, an invisible barrier 
blocks their vertical movement up the hier- 
archy, particularly to top positions (Morrison 
and Glinow 1990; Garland 1991; Jacobs 
1992; Reskin and Roos 1992). If this image 
is accurate, then in general the gender gap in 
the amount of authority men and women 
have once they get into the authority hierar- 
chy should be greater than the gender gap in 
simply having authority. 
We explore gender differences in the 
amount of authority in two ways. First, we 
construct a variable, referred to as the 
amount-of-authority scale, that combines the 
three measures of authority into a 10-level 
scale. We then examine the net gender gap in 
this variable in the same the way we exam- 
ine the net gender gap in the probability of 
having authority. 
Second, we explore a weak form of the 
glass-ceiling hypothesis more directly by ex- 
amining the gender gap in authority sepa- 
rately for those people who have made it into 
the authority hierarchy. The expression "the 
glass ceiling" is sometimes used restrictively 
to refer to barriers at the top of authority hi- 
erarchies, not simply barriers to promotion 
out of lower levels of the hierarchy. Because 
of sample size limitations, we cannot exam- 
ine gender differences at the highest levels 
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of the formal authority hierarchy. We there- 
fore examine the gender gap in the amount 
of authority people have conditional upon 
them having any authority. If the gender gap 
in amount of authority for people in the au- 
thority hierarchy is the same or smaller than 
that for the sample as a whole, then this un- 
dermines the glass-ceiling hypothesis that 
gender discrimination is less intense at the 
port of entry into the hierarchy than it is in 
promotions within it. This would not, of 
course, imply that gender discrimination was 
absent in vertical promotions within author- 
ity hierarchies, only that such discrimination 
is no more intense than the discrimination 
that affects entry into the hierarchy. 
Explaining Cross-National Variation in the 
Gender Gap 
We pursue two different strategies for explor- 
ing possible explanations for the cross-na- 
tional variations in the gender gap in author- 
ity. First, we compare the differences across 
countries in the gross gender gaps in author- 
ity (i.e., country-specific gender gaps not 
controlling for compositional effects) with 
the differences across countries net of the 
various compositional factors. If a significant 
portion of the gender gap within countries is 
explained by such compositional factors, 
then these factors may also account for much 
of the variation across countries in the gen- 
der gap. For example, women in Sweden are 
much more likely to be employed in part- 
time work than are women in the United 
States, and employees in part-time work are 
much less likely to have workplace author- 
ity. Thus, the larger gross gender gap in au- 
thority in Sweden compared to that in the 
United States may be mainly a result of this 
difference in employment patterns. 
Second, if significant differences across 
countries in the gender authority gap remain 
after controlling for all of the compositional 
factors, we then examine in a somewhat less 
formal way several macrosocial explanations 
by comparing the rank-order of the seven 
countries on the net gender gap in authority 
with their rank-order on the following vari- 
ables: 
( I )  Gender ideology. All things being 
equal, a smaller gender gap in workplace au- 
thority is expected in societies with relatively 
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egalitarian gender ideologies compared to 
societies with less egalitarian ideologies. 
( 2 )  Women's reproductive and sexual 
rights. Although women in all democratic 
capitalist states (except some cantons in 
Switzerland) now have equal voting rights, 
countries differ on other issues that bear on 
the rights of women with respect to sexual 
and reproductive issues, such as rights to 
abortion, rights to paid pregnancy and ma- 
ternity leave from work, and laws concern- 
ing sexual violence, abuse, and harassment. 
Although such state-backed rights and pro- 
visions may not directly prevent discrimina- 
tory practices in promotions, they may con- 
tribute to the political climate in ways that 
indirectly affect the degree of inequality in 
promotions and thus in workplace authority. 
(3)Gender gap in earnings. Societies with 
a relatively small gender gap in earnings may 
also be expected to have a relatively small 
gender gap in workplace authority. The ar- 
gument is not that greater equality in the 
earning capacities of men and women is a 
cause of a smaller authority gap (if anything, 
a smaller gender gap in authority could itself 
contribute to narrowing the gender gap in 
earnings), but rather that a society that fos- 
ters low levels of income inequality between 
men and women is also likely to foster low 
levels of authority inequality. Small differ- 
ences in earnings by gender would therefore 
be taken as an indicator of an underlying in- 
stitutional commitment to gender equality as 
such. 
(4) Occupational sex segregation. The 
logical relationship between occupational sex 
segregation and gender inequalities in work- 
place authority is complex. Clearly, the prob- 
ability of having authority varies from occu- 
pation to occupation, and thus occupational 
sex segregation can reasonably be viewed as 
one likely cause of inequalities in authority. 
However, if norms against women supervis- 
ing men are strong and unchanging, then, in a 
limited way, occupational sex segregation 
might open up managerial positions for 
women in so far as it increases the chances of 
women being able to supervise only women. 
Furthermore, promotions into positions of 
authority often entail changes in occupational 
titles, particularly for occupations that are 
formally called "managerial occupations." 
Thus, barriers to acquiring workplace author- 
ity for women may contribute to occupational 
sex segregation. In examining variations 
across countries in occupational sex-segrega- 
tion, therefore, we are not suggesting that this 
variation is itself a direct cause of variation 
in the net gender gap in authority. Rather, as 
in the case of the earnings gap, we treat occu- 
pational sex segregation as an indicator of 
underlying processes that shape gender in- 
equalities in the society. 
(5) The proportion of the labor force with 
authority. There are two reasons for expect- 
ing the gender gap to be greater in countries 
in which a relatively small proportion of the 
labor force holds positions of authority, than 
in countries with proportionately many au- 
thority positions. First, it is more difficult for 
employers and top executives to adequately 
fill authority positions with men in countries 
in which a high proportion of the employees 
of organizations have authority. In terms of 
supply and demand, therefore, employers 
have an incentive to fill a higher proportion 
of authority positions with women in coun- 
tries with a large proportion of managerial 
and supervisory positions in the job struc-
ture. Such recruitment, in turn, means that 
women are likely to develop social networks 
that facilitate subsequent recruitment and 
promotion of women (Kanter 1977). 
Second, if, as some scholars argue (Berg- 
man 1986; Reskin 1988; Acker 1990), the 
gender gap in authority is at least partially a 
result of men's interests in maintaining male 
predominance in the authority hierarchy, 
then the incentive for men to try to do so 
would be stronger where there are relatively 
few such positions to go around. This need 
not imply a coordinated conspiracy by men. 
Rather, when authority is a scarce good, in- 
dividual male managers will be concerned 
with protecting their networks and reducing 
competition for managerial positions, and 
one by-product of this will be the exclusion 
of women. A large managerial population, 
therefore, increases the incentive for the 
heads of organizations to recruit women into 
managerial positions, and reduces the incen- 
tive for male managers to engage in restric- 
tive practices to protect their positions. 
(6) The women's movement and political 
culture. If sex discrimination plays a signifi- 
cant role in the exclusion of women from po- 
sitions of responsibility and power within 
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work, then it would be expected that one de- 
terminant of the erosion of such sexist prac- 
tices would be the extent and forms of 
women's organized challenge to these prac- 
tices. Two issues are especially important. 
First, the overall strength of the women's 
movement is crucial for its ability to chal- 
lenge the gender gap in workplace authority. 
Second, and perhaps less obvious, the ideo-
logical orientation of the women's movement 
may shape the extent to which it directs its 
energies toward workplace discrimination. 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish 
women's movements that are primarily con- 
cerned with directly improving women's eco- 
nomic and social welfare and women's move- 
ments that are more concerned with equaliz- 
ing women's and men's access to positions of 
social power through which welfare is dis- 
tributed. The former kind of movement, often 
linked to social democratic politics, focuses 
on the provision of services and benefits of 
interest to women; the latter kind of move- 
ment, more associated with liberal politics, 
focuses on questions of rights, opportunities, 
and discrimination. This reasoning suggests 
the prediction that, all things being equal, the 
gender gap in authority should be lower in 
countries with a liberal rights-oriented 
women's movement than in those with a so- 
cial democratic women's movement. 
DATA 
The data for this analysis come from the 
Comparative Project on Class Structure and 
Class Consciousness (Wright 1989), which 
consists of a series of replicated surveys on a 
broad array of questions concerned with so- 
cial relations in production and related mat- 
ters carried out in the first part of the 1980s. 
With a few minor variations,. exactly the 
same questions on authority were asked in all 
countries in the sample. The basic properties 
of the seven samples are described in Table 
1. Throughout the analysis we restrict the 
national samples to employees in the labor 
force, thereby excluding respondents who 
are self-employed, unemployed, or outside 
the labor force. Self-employed people with 
employees-employers-can be considered 
to have authority within the workplace, but 
since the causal processes surrounding gen- 
der differences in authority among employ- 
Table 1. Properties of the Sample 
Interview Sample 
Country Method Size Date 
United States Telephone 1,498 1980 
Australia Personal 1,195 1986 
United Kingdom Personal 1,770 1984 
Canada Personal 2,577 1982 
Sweden Telephonelmail 1,145 1980 
Norway Personal 2,532 1982 
Japana Personal 823 1987 
a Japanese sample is for Tokyo and environs and 
covers approximately 40 percent of the Japanese 
population. 
ees differ from gender differences in prop- 
erty ownership, we exclude the self-em- 
ployed from this analysis. 
VARIABLES 
The general operational criteria for the vari- 
ables are presented in Tables 2a and 2b. 
Authority 
We study workplace authority using measures 
of three distinct dimensions of authority. 
( I )  Formal hierarchical position. Em-
ployee respondents were asked: "Which of 
the following best describes the position 
which you hold within your business or orga- 
nization? Would it be a managerial position, 
a supervisory position, or a nonmanagement 
position?'Respondents who answered "man- 
agerial" were then asked, "Would that be a 
top, upper, middle, or lower managerial posi- 
tion?" Taking these two questions together 
generates a six-category variable going from 
top manager to nonmanagement positions. 
The variable formal position is a dichotomy 
with a value of 1 if a person is at least a su- 
pervisor in the formal hierarchy and 0 if the 
person is in a nonmanagement position. 
(2)  Sanctioning authority. This variable 
refers to the capacity of individuals to im- 
pose rewards and punishments on subordi- 
nates. Respondents were first asked a general 
filter question: "As an official part of your 
main job do you supervise the work of other 
employees or tell other employees what work 
to do?" If respondents said "yes," they were 
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Table 2a. Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable 	 Definition 
AUTHORITY VARIABLES 
Sanctioning authority 	 Has direct influence on pay, promotions, or punishments of subordinates 
(dummy variable) 
Decision-making authority 	 Directly participates in policy decisions in the workplace (not just 
provides advice) (dummy variable) 
Formal position 	 Occupies a position in the formal authority structure of the workplace: 
supervisor, lower manager, middle manager, upper manager, or top 
manager (dummy variable) 
Authority dichotomy 	 Positive response to any two of the three dimensions of authority above 
(dummy variable) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Firm Attributes 
Industry 	 Dummy variables distinguishing extractive, transformative (manufactur- 
ing, transportation, utilities) and service sectors; contrast category is the 
transformative sector 
Prive versus state Dummy variable distinguishing public and private sector employees 
employment (1 = private) 
Firm sizea 	 Continuous variable measuring respondent's estimate of the number of 
employees in the firm (not the establishment) in which the respondent is 
employed (for private sector only) 
Job Attributes 
Occupation 	 Three dummy variables: upper white collar, lower white collar, upper 
manual; omitted category is lower manual 
Full-time 	 dummy variable, 1 = works at least 30 hourslweek, 0 = less than 30 
hours per week 
Personal Attributes 
Education 	 Years of education 
Age in years 
Continuous labor force Dummy variable, 0 = interrupted labor force history, 1 = continuous 
participationb labor force participation since first full-time job after completing 
education 
Tenurec 	 Years employed at current employer 
Household Attributes 
Children 	 Dummy variable, 1 = children present in the home, 0 = no children 
living in the home 
Married 	 Dummy variable, 1 = married, 0 = not married 
Houseworkd 	 Husband's contribution to five housework tasks, measured by the 
respondent's report of the percentage of total time for each task 
performed by the husband (see Wright et al. 1992 for details) 
a Not available for Australia 

Not available for Australia, Japan, and Sweden 

W o t  available for Sweden and the United Kingdom 

Not available for Japan and the United Kingdom 
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Table 2b. Amount-of-Authority Scale 
Author- Sanc-
ity Di- tioning Position in 
Value chotomy Authority Formal Hierarchy 
0 no - -
1 yes yes 0 = nonmanagement 
2 yes no 1 = supervisor 
3 yes yes 1 = supervisor 
4 yes no 2 = lower manager 
5 yes yes 2 = lower manager 
6 yes no 3 = middle manager 
7 yes yes 3 = middle manager 
8 yes no 4,5 = upper or top 
manager 
9 yes yes 4,5 = upper or top 
manager 
then asked a series of detailed questions 
about their ability to impose sanctions of 
various kinds on subordinates: granting a pay 
raise or promotion to a subordinate, prevent- 
ing a subordinate from getting a pay raise or 
promotion because of poor work or misbe- 
havior, firing or temporarily suspending a 
subordinate. We define a person as having 
sanctioning authority if they say that they 
have any influence on any of these three 
forms of sanctioning. In the U.S. sample, 
about 63 percent of people who said they su- 
pervised other employees on the job also 
claimed to have sanctioning authority. The 
variable sanctioning authority is given a 
value of 1 if the respondent has such powers 
and 0 if the respondent does not. 
(3)Decision-making authority. This vari- 
able concerns the direct participation of re- 
spondents in organizational policymaking 
decisions. Respondents were first asked a fil- 
ter question about decision-making respon- 
sibilities: "The next question concerns poli- 
cymaking at your workplace; that is, making 
decisions about such things as the products 
or services delivered, the total number of 
people employed, budgets, and so forth. Do 
you participate in making these kinds of de- 
cisions or even provide advice about them?" 
Individuals who responded "yes" were then 
asked more focused questions about their 
participation in five specific kinds of policy 
decisions: to increase or decrease the total 
number of people employed in the place 
where you work; to significantly change the 
products, programs, or services delivered by 
the organization; to change the policy con- 
cerning the routine pace of work or amount 
of work performed in your workplace as a 
whole; to significantly change the basic 
methods or procedures of work used in a ma- 
jor part of the workplace; to affect the size 
or distribution of the budget at the place of 
work. For each of these decisions, respon- 
dents were asked exactly how they partici- 
pate in the decision-making process: make 
the decision on your own authority; partici- 
pate as a voting member of a group that 
makes the decision; make the decision sub- 
ject to approval; provide advice to the per- 
son who actually makes the decision. The 
variable decision-making authority has a 
value of 1 if the respondent directly partici- 
pates in any of these decisions and 0 if they 
only provide advice for decisions or do not 
participate at a1L6 
Sanctioning authority and decision-making 
authority are not equivalent to the formal hi- 
erarchy question above. A person can have 
authority by the sanctioning criterion or the 
decision-making criterion and yet not be in 
the "formal" authority hierarchy or, alterna- 
tively, be in the formal hierarchy without hav- 
ing sanctioning or decision-making authority. 
For example, in the United States, 15percent 
of the men and about 30percent of the women 
who reported that they were top or upper 
managers on the formal hierarchy measure 
indicated that they lacked sanctioning author- 
ity, and about 20 percent of men and 40 per- 
cent of women in such positions said that they 
did not participate in any decision-making. 
Similar results appear in other countries. 
These three dimensions were used to form 
two constructed variables: 
(4) The authority-dichotomy variable. 
This variable has a value of 1 if the respon- 
dent has a value of 1 on any two of the three 
dimensions, and 0 otherwise. In effect, the 
Respondents who said "yes" to the filter ques- 
tion and also indicated that they did not partici-
pate in any of these policy decisions were then 
asked an open-ended question about the kinds of 
decisions in which they participated. If any of 
these responses indicated involvement in a sub- 
stantial area of decision-making, they were also 
considered decision-makers. Few respondents in 
any country gave open-ended answers to this 
question. 
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three aspects of authority are treated as mul- 
tiple indicators of "true" authority. The au- 
thority-dichotomy variable thus distinguishes 
between those individuals who we are confi- 
dent have authority and those who almost 
certainly do not. 
(5) Amount-of-authority scale. This vari- 
able attempts to tap variation in the "amount" 
of authority controlled by the respondent. 
The idea that authority varies in amount is 
complex, since the meaning of having high, 
middle, or low "amounts" of authority de- 
pends on the details of different organiza- 
tional settings. The number of distinct kinds 
of decisions in which a person is involved, 
for example, may not be a good indicator of 
how much authority a person has, since cer- 
tain kinds of decisions may be more or less 
important in different kinds of organizations, 
and the division of labor among managers 
can be significantly affected by such things 
as organizational size. In our data, the mea- 
sure most clearly linked to the amount of au- 
thority is formal hierarchical position since, 
within a given hierarchy, the ability to issue 
binding orders generally increases as one 
moves from bottom to top.7 The amount-of-
authority scale, therefore, relies more 
heavily on the formal hierarchical position 
measure than on the other two dimensions of 
authority. Respondents who receive a 0 on 
the authority dichotomy variable also get a 0 
on the amount-of-authority scale. Respon- 
dents who have authority on the dichotomy 
are then assigned values of 1 to 9 on the 
amount-of-authority scale depending prima- 
rily on their formal position in the hierarchy 
and secondarily on their possession of sanc- 
tioning authority (Table 2b). 
Control Variables 
Four groups of control variables are used to 
explore the possibility that gender differ- 
ences in authority are the result of gender 
differences in firm attributes, job attributes, 
personal attributes, or household attributes. 
Of course, whether an "upper manager" in 
one organization has more or less authority than 
a "middle manager" in a different organization is 
less clear. Does a top manager in a small firm 
have more or less authority than a middle man- 
ager in General Motors? This problem of equiva- 
lence in meanings across organizations may in- 
Most of these variables are available in an 
identical form for all seven countries in our 
analysis, but a few are missing from some 
countries. We therefore always conduct two 
separate analyses-one using only variables 
that are present for every country, and one 
including all available variables for each 
country. Since the results for these two anal- 
yses are virtually identical, we only report 
the coefficients for the analysis using vari- 
ables available for every country. 
We use part-time versus full-time employ- 
ment as a dichotomous variable rather than 
total hours worked, since work hours ex-
tended beyond normal full time are in part a 
consequence of being a manager rather than 
a determinant of the chances of becoming a 
manager. We also use a relatively crude four- 
category occupational classification to avoid 
problems of circularity that are introduced if 
a more refined set of categories were used. 
Remember that our definition of authority is 
operationally independent from the formal 
"occupation" in which a person is employed. 
Many people in lower white-collar occupa- 
tions have significant amounts of authority, 
when authority is measured directly in terms 
of the powers people exercise on the job. Only 
a minority of people with high levels of au- 
thority are in jobs that bear the occupational 
title "manager" (and not all people in jobs 
that are called "manager" have authority by 
our criteria). Still, if we used an occupational 
variable with a higher level of disaggregation, 
this would create a category like "managerial 
occupations" which is too closely tied con- 
ceptually to the dependent variable to be 
treated as a compositional control. 
One important variable that probably af- 
fects promotion prospects-total labor mar- 
ket experience-was not available in most 
countries. We thus have to rely on job tenure 
with current employer, age, and labor force 
interruptions to tap labor market experience. 
Since these variables, taken together, are 
highly correlated with total labor market ex- 
perience, it seems unlikely that the omission 
of a direct measure of experience seriously 
compromises our results. 
troduce some error into our measures since the 
people in our sample who claim to be "top" or 
"upper" managers are likely to be employed, on 
average, in smaller organizations than those who 
claim to be middle or lower managers. 
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Cross-National Comparability of Authority 
Measures 
Although identical questions were asked in 
each of the national surveys, the meaning of 
the questions may differ significantly cross- 
culturally. For example, it could be the case 
that in some countries the label "supervisor" 
in the formal hierarchy question is frequently 
used as a largely honorific title implying no 
real powers, whereas in other countries it is 
used only if real powers are present. If 
women are more likely than men to get the 
honorific supervisor title in some countries 
but not others, then the gender gap in author- 
ity might appear smaller in the country with 
honorific supervisor titles than in the coun- 
try where the term "supervisor" is used more 
restrictively. 
Although we cannot be certain that our re- 
sults are not affected by such shifts in the 
meaning of questions, there are three rea- 
sons why we feel this is not a significant 
problem in our analyses. First, two of our 
three measures of authority (sanctioning and 
decision-making) ask respondents what they 
actually do on their jobs, not what formal 
labels describe their jobs. These questions 
should be less vulnerable to problems of 
meaning. Second, in our two constructed 
measures of authority, a person must satisfy 
at least two of the three authority criteria, 
which means that the bias would have to 
work in the same direction on two of the 
measures in order to create a biased overall 
measure. Finally, the cross-national differ- 
ences in the distributions of sanctioning au- 
thority within levels of the formal hierarchy 
variable indicate that, if anything, countries 
with the largest gender gap are the countries 
in which the formal hierarchy titles have the 
least substantive content. The United States 
and Australia have relatively small gender 
authority gaps compared to the two Scandi- 
navian countries. Yet over 50 percent of the 
women in supervisor positions in the formal 
hierarchy in these countries say they have 
sanctioning authority, whereas in Norway 
and Sweden-countries with significantly 
larger gender gaps in authority-the figures 
are only 25 percent and 15 percent respec- 
tively. If anything, then, the "supervisor" 
title appears to have a more honorific mean- 
ing in countries with a large gender gap in 
authority than in countries with a smaller 
gender gap. In any event, our measures of 
authority are more comparable across coun- 
tries than any others we know of, and thus 
this is a plausible set of data for exploring 
cross-national variation in gender patterns 
in workplace authority. 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The basic analytical strategy for the dichoto- 
mous dependent variables involves using lo- 
gistic regression to predict the log odds of 
having workplace authority. To determine the 
basic zero-order gender gap in authority 
Model 1 estimates, separately for each coun- 
try, logistic regressions in which gender is 
the only independent variable: 
where Pr(Authority = 1) is the probability of 
a person having authority as defined by our 
various measures, Pr(Authority = 0) is the 
probability of a person not having authority, 
and female is a dummy variable. The signifi- 
cance of the coefficient for gender in this 
model is a test of whether men and women 
differ significantly in their chances of hav- 
ing managerial authority. 
To evaluate the net gender gap, Model 2 
adds the control variables to test whether the 
bivariate relationship between gender and 
authority reflects other factors that are corre- 
lated with gender and managerial authority: 
Pr(Authority=1) 
=a +blFemale 

log Pr(Authori9 =0) 

where the Xiare the firm attribute, job at-
tribute, and person attribute variables listed 
in Table 2a. 
In interpreting the logistic regressions, we 
focus on the coefficients for gender from the 
bivariate and multivariate equations. Since 
gender is a dummy variable (1 = female), the 
coefficient indicates the difference between 
women's and men's logged odds of having 
managerial authority. Taking the antilog of 
the coefficient yields an odds ratio indicat- 
ing the relative odds of a woman having 
managerial authority compared to a man. The 
"gender gap" can then be defined as 1 minus 
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the antilog of the logit coefficient for gen- 
der: if this equals 0, there is no gender gap in 
authority; if it equals 1, no women at all have 
authority. In Model 1 we will refer to this as 
the "gross gender gap" and in Model 2 as the 
"net gender gap" in workplace authority. 
Our analysis of the amount-of-authority 
scale uses cumulative logistic (also called or- 
dered logistic) regression. This method has 
an advantage over ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression of not assuming equal in- 
tervals between the levels in the dependent 
variable and of generating a coefficient for 
gender that is conceptually analogous to the 
coefficients in the logistic regressions for the 
authority dichotomy. The cumulative logit 
for a dependent variable with J ordered cat- 
egories is defined as: 
PI+...+Pj
Lj = log 
Pj+l+...+PJ 
where j = 1, . . . , J - 1, and Pi is the prob- 
ability of being in category j of the depen- 
dent variable (Agresti 1990:321). The multi- 
variate model for the net differences in the 
amount of authority for men and women is 
then estimated according to: 
Lj = aj +b,Female +xibiXi, 
where j = 1, . . . ,J- 1. Each logit is a func- 
tion of a separate intercept and a common set 
of slope coefficients. The coefficient of the 
gender variable in equation 4 is thus like a 
weighted average of the coefficients for gen- 
der in a series of separately calculated logit 
regressions using equation 2 in which the de- 
pendent variable-the amount-of-authority 
scale in this case-is successively dichoto- 
mized at each possible point. 
Since we are only interested in the coeffi- 
cients for gender, we do not present the co- 
efficients for the control variables, except in 
the analysis of self-selection where some of 
these coefficients are important for the inter- 
pretation of the results. 
RESULTS 
Gross Gender Differences in 
Having Authority 
Tables 3a and 3b present the percentage of 
men and women who have different kinds of 
authority for the seven countries. Figure 1 
presents the gender gaps in authority (1 mi- 
nus antilogs of the coefficients for gender) 
for the authority dichotomy. Table 4 presents 
the coefficients for gender from the logistic 
regression analysis of gross gender differ- 
ences in each of our measures of authority 
using Model Several results are striking. 
First, in each country and for each measure 
of authority, there is a significant gender gap: 
Women are less likely than men to be in the 
formal authority hierarchy, to have sanction- 
ing power over subordinates, or to participate 
in organizational policy decisions. 
Second, as shown for Model 1 in Figure 1 
and Table 4, there is statistically significant 
cross-national variation in the degree of gen- 
der inequality in authority. On each measure 
of authority, the United States and Australia 
have the smallest gender gap in authority, and 
Japan has by far the largest gapeg On the basis 
of the exponentiated gender gap coefficients, 
in Japan the odds of a woman having author- 
ity are only between 3 percent and 9 percent 
the odds of a man having authority (depend- 
ing on the measure), whereas the odds of a 
woman in the United States or Australia hav- 
ing authority are generally around 50 percent 
to 60 percent of a man's odds. The other two 
English speaking countries-Canada and the 
United Kingdom-tend to have larger gender 
gaps in authority than do the United States 
and Australia, but smaller gaps than the two 
Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Nor- 
way.10 Although in many respects the Scan- 
'The tests for differences between countries in 
the coefficients for gender in the models predict- 
ing sanctioning authority and formal position are 
virtually identical to the results for the aggregated 
authority dichotomy. Fewer statistically signifi- 
cant differences between countries are found 
when predicting the decision-making variable. 
The gender gap in authority in Japan as esti- 
mated by our direct measures of authority is even 
greater than the 9 to 1 ratio estimated by Brinton 
(1988:311) using managerial occupations as the 
criterion. 
l o  In Model 1 for the authority dichotomy, the 
Canadian coefficient for gender is significantly 
bigger than the coefficients for the United States 
and Australia (but not for the United Kingdom), 
indicating a larger gender gap in authority. While 
the coefficient for the United Kingdom is nearly 
as large as the coefficient in Canada, i t  is not sig- 
nificantly different (at the p < .05level) from the 
U.S. and Australian coefficients. 
Table 3a. Percentage Distribution of Men and Women with Authority, by Type of Authority: Seven Countries 
Decision-Making Sanctioning Formal Authority Number of 
Authority Authority Position Dichotomy Respondents 
Country Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
United States 22.3 13.1 32.1 20.5 37.6 25.9 29.9 18.7 629 549 
Australia 37.0 29.9 37.9 23.4 50.4 39.9 40.3 27.4 543 463 
United Kingdom 24.0 12.3 27.9 10.9 38.7 22.4 29.5 13.6 594 457 
Canada 26.1 14.3 25.0 10.2 35.4 18.8 26.6 11.1 785 639 
Sweden 19.7 10.8 17.4 4.7 34.1 16.3 21.9 5.3 549 436 
Norway 26.6 12.7 23.3 4.1 39.4 10.7 29.4 5.4 827 588 
Japan 28.5 3.5 34.0 2.9 47.0 3.5 38.3 1.7 253 173 
Table 3b. Percentage Distribution of Men and Women, by Position in the Formal Authority Hierarchy: Seven Countries 
Position in the Formal Hierarchy 
TOP Upper Middle Lower Nonmanagerl Number of 
Manager Manager Manager Manager Supervisor Supervisor Respondents 
Countrv Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
United States 3.3 2.8 4.5 1.5 5.7 3.6 3.3 2.2 20.7 15.9 62.4 74.1 622 
Australia 3.0 1.9 5.9 2.1 8.7 4.1 2.4 2.6 30.3 29.1 49.6 60.1 492 
United Kingdom 3.9 .9 1.2 .2 8.6 1.8 4.9 1.1 20.2 18.4 61.3 77.6 594 
Canada 3.7 .9 5.2 .9 5.4 3.0 2.3 2.0 18.9 11.9 64.6 81.2 785 
Sweden 1.9 1.0 2.3 .O 6.2 1.7 4.9 2.6 18.8 11.1 65.9 83.7 53 1 
Norway 5.0 .9 5.5 .9 5.1 .5 0.5 .2 23.4 8.3 60.6 89.3 822 
Japan 1.2 .O 4.3 .O 2.8 .O 1.6 .O 37.2 3.5 53.0 96.5 253 
seven Countriesa 
Dimensions of Authority Constructed Measures of Authority 
Decision-Making Sanctioning Formal Authority Authority Amount-of-Authority 
Authority Authority Position Dichotomy Scale 
Logistic Gender Logistic Gender Logistic Gender Logistic Gender Logistic Gender 
CountrylN Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap 
United States 
N = 1,178 
Australia 
N = 1,006 
United Kingdom 
N = 1,051 
Canada 
N = 1,424 
Sweden 
N = 985 
Norway 
N = 1,415 
Japan 
N = 426 
p < .05 
"Significance levels for differences (two-tailed tests) between rank-ordered countries on aggregate authority measures: 
Overall Authority Dichotomy L.031 r 1 
(p-value of differences in Australia - [.85] -U.S.A. - [.09] -U.K. - [.69] -Canada - [.05] -Sweden - [.24] -Norway - [.01] -Japan 
logits between countries) I I 
L.061 
Amount of Authority Scale [.001] I (p-value of differences in cumulative U.S.A. - [.92] -Australia - [.03] -U.K. - [.76] -Canada - [.lo] - bede en - [.19] -Norway - [.02] -Japan 
logits between countries) 
Explanation: The countries are ranked from small to large according to gender gaps in authority. The numbers in square brackets represent the p-values for the 
differences between adjacent rank-ordered countries in their gender coefficients in the relevant equation. In situations in which thep-value does not fall below the p < .05 
threshhold for adjacent countries in the rank order, the closest pair of countries whose coefficients differ at the p < .05 level is indicated above or below the list of 
countries. In all cases the significance levels are internally consistent across rank-orders. 
Table 4. Logistic Coefficients for Gender from Regression Predicting the Odds of Women Having Work Authority Relative to Men: Model with No Controls, 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The gender gap is defined as 1 minus the antilog of the coefficient. 
-
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Figure 1. The Gender Gap in Authority: Seven Countries in the 1980s 
Note: Bars of different shades indicate differences significant at p < .05 or better, with two exceptions: 
For Model 1, the differences between the United Kingdom and Australia @ < .06) and between the United 
Kingdom and the United States @ < .09) are not significant. 
dinavian countries are among the most egali- 
tarian in the world in terms of both class and 
gender relations, with respect to the distribu- 
tion of authority in the workplace they are 
clearly less egalitarian than the four English- 
speaking countries in our analysis. 
Third, while a gender gap appears for all 
of our measures of authority, it is generally 
somewhat more muted for decision-making 
authority than for sanctioning authority and 
position in the formal hierarchy. In all coun- 
tries except the United States, the gender gap 
is considerably smaller for decision-making 
authority than for the other two measures, 
and the cross-national variation is less sig- 
nificant. While this may reflect a weakness 
in our measure of decision-making, it may 
also indicate that the most salient issue in 
gender inequalities in authority is direct 
power over people rather than organizational 
responsibilities as such. 
Net Gender Gap in Authority 
Table 5 presents the coefficients for gender 
for Model 2. These coefficients show the 
gender gap in authority net of compositional 
differences between men and women on the 
other variables in the equation. 
The results in Table 5 and Figure 1 clearly 
demonstrate that relatively little of the gross 
differences in authority among men and 
women in any country can be attributed to 
gender differences in these control variables. 
The biggest compositional effects seem to be 
in the United States and the United King- 
dom, where roughly 20 percent of the total 
gender gap in authority is closed when con- 
trols are added." Figures for the other coun- 
I '  If compositional factors accounted for the 
gender gap, then the gender gap measure (1 -
exponentiated gender coefficient) in Model 2 
Table 5. 	 Logistic Coefficients for Gender for Regression Predicting the Odds of Women Having Work Authority Relative to Men: Model with Controls, Seven 
Countriesa 
Dimensions of Authority 	 Contructed Measures of Authority 
Formal Amount of Percent Reduc- 
Decision-Making Sanctioning Authority Authority Authority tion in Gross 
Authority Authority Position Dichotomy Scale Gender Gap for Authority
Net Net Net Net Net Dichotomy when 
Coeffi- Gender Coeffi- Gender Coeffi- Gender Coeffi- Gender Coeffi- Gender Controls are 
Country cient Gap cient Gap cient Gap cient Gap cient Gap Addedb 
United States -.55* .42 -.51* .40 -.48* .38 -.45* .36 -.51* .40 22% 
(.19) (.17) (.17). . (.la) 
Australia -.5 1' .40 
(.I72 
United Kingdom -.72 .5 1. 
(.22) 
Canada 
. . 
Sweden -35' .57 
(.24) 
Norway -.95* .61 
(.18) 
Japan 
a Significance levels for differences (two-tailed tests) between rank-ordered countries on aggregate authority measures: 
Overall Authority Dichotomy 
(p-value of differences in logits U.S.A. - [.54] -Australia -[.71] -U.K. - [.55] -Canada - [.04] -Sweden - [.65] -Norway - [.01] -Japan 
between countries) [.005]
Amount of Authority Scale 
(p-value of differences in cumulative U.S.A. -[.82] -Aus/nlia -[.22] -U.K. -1.871-Canada - [.@I -Sw!den - [.59] -Norway - [.03] -Japan 
logits between countries) 
Explanation: The countries ranked from small to large gender gaps in authority. The numbers in square brackets represent the p-values for the differences between 
adjacent rank-ordered countries in their gender coefficients in the relevant equation. In situations in which the p-value does not fall below the p < .05 threshhold for 
adjacent countries in the rank order, the closest pair of countries whose coefficients differ at thep < .05 level is indicated above or below the list of countries. In all cases 
the significance levels are internally consistent across rank-orders. 
Percent reduction in gross gender gap = (Gap in Model 1 -Gap in Model 2)/(Gap in Model 1). 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The gender gap is defined as 1 minus the antilog of the coefficient. Control variables are industry, state, 
occupation, part-time, education, and age. 
tries range from virtually 0 percent in Japan 
and Australia to 12 percent in Canada. 
Nearly all of the modest reduction in the gen- 
der gap in authority in the United States and 
the United Kingdom comes from two job at- 
tributes (occupation and full-time employ- 
ment); inclusion of the personal attribute 
variables in the equation has almost no af- 
fect on the gender gap. 
Table 5 also shows that while the signifi- 
cance of some of the cross-national differ- 
ences declines after controlling for compo- 
sitional effects, the basic pattern is essen- 
tially the same as that for the gross gender 
differences. In particular, in the equations 
predicting the authority dichotomy, the only 
change between Model 1 and Model 2 is 
that in Model 2 the gender coefficients 
among the four English-speaking countries 
no longer differ significantly. For the net 
gender gap, therefore, we have a very clear 
grouping of our seven countries: the four 
English-speaking countries have the small- 
est net gender gaps in authority, the two 
Scandinavian countries have significantly 
larger net gender gaps, and Japan has by far 
the largest gap. 
While it is always possible that we have 
omitted some crucial compositional variable 
from the analysis, nevertheless, these results 
strongly support the claim that gender dif- 
ferences in authority and cross-national pat- 
terns of these differences are not primarily 
the result of differences in the distributions 
of relevant attributes of men and women and 
their employment situations. This adds cred- 
ibility to the claim that direct discrimination 
or self-selection in the promotion process 
are important. 
Self-Selection Models 
The self-selection hypothesis states that be- 
cause of family responsibilities women vol- 
untarily make themselves less available for 
promotion into positions of authority in the 
workplace. We explore this hypothesis 
would be 0. In the United States, the gender gap 
for the authority dichotomy is .46 in Model 1 
(Table 4). The gender gap in the model with con- 
trols is .36 (Table 5). The difference between 
these coefficients is .lo, which is 21.7 percent of 
.46, the gender gap from Model 1 .  
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through the following interaction composi- 
tion model: 
Pr(Authority = 1 )  
= a +b,Female 

log Pr(Authority =0) 

+b4 Husband's Housework 
+b5(Femalex Married) 
+b6(Femalex Children) 
+b, (Female x Husband's Housework) 
+xi ( 5 )b,X,, 
where the Xi are the compositional variables 
in Model 2 that are available for all coun- 
tries. If self-selection is a powerful force in 
shaping the gender gap in authority, then the 
interaction terms in these equations should 
be statistically significant. 
Table 6 presents the coefficients for gen- 
der and the interaction terms using the au- 
thority dichotomy as the dependent vari- 
able.'* None of the interactions are signifi- 
cant in the United States, Sweden, and Aus- 
tralia. In Norway and Canada, however, the 
interaction of female with husband's contri- 
bution to housework is significant. In Can- 
ada, the interaction of female with married 
approaches the p c .05level of significance 
and becomes statistically significant when 
the interaction of female with children is 
dropped.13 Among married women in these 
l 2  These models could not be estimated for Ja- 
pan and the United Kingdom because these coun- 
tries lacked data on the division of labor in the 
household. The interaction terms in a simpler 
model without this variable were not significant 
for these two countries. 
l 3  The coefficient for female x married in 
Canada is -1.20 with a standard error of .48 when 
the female x children interaction term is dropped. 
In no other country is this interaction term sig- 
nificant. However, if the Xi compositional terms 
are also excluded (but not the self-selection vari- 
ables), the female x married interaction term is 
also significant in Norway. The coefficient for 
this interaction indicates that married women 
have a significantly lower probability of having 
authority than do married men; it does not say 
that married women have a lower probability of 
having authority than single women. There is no 
significant difference in the likelihood of author- 
ity between married women and single women. 
The significant married x female interaction 
comes from the fact that married men have a sig- 
for Authority Dichotomy): Seven Countries 
Gender Gap for Authority Dichotomy at selected 
Values of Self-Selection 1ndicatorsb 
Married in Rela- Married in Relatively Coefficientsa tively Egalitarian House Inegalitarian House- 
Female x Unmarried holdsC without Children holdsd with Children 
Female x Female x Husband's (Weak Self-Selection (Intermediate Self- (Maximum Self- 
Country Female Married Children Housework Pressures) Selection Pressures) Selection Pressures) 
United States -.46 -.32 .21 .009 .37 .33 .38 
~ 2 7 )  (.43) ("35) (.OIO) 
Australia -.31 -.21 -.01 -.004 .27 .49 .44 
~ 2 9 )  (.49) (.35) (.OIO) 
Canada -.13 -.94 -.49 .0208 .I3 .23 .82 
(.36) (.52) (.38) (.OIO) 
Sweden -1.61* -.36 .I8 ,009 .80 .80 .82 
(.54) (.84) (.58) (.020) 
Norway -1.42' -.84 -.22 .025* .76 .71 .89 
~ 5 2 )  (.71) (.47) (.O 125) 
~ 
* p < .05 

" Logit coefficients are from the model with compositional controls and interactions with selection variables predicting authority dichotomy: 

log[Pr (Authority = 1) / Pr (Authority = O)] = a + b,Female + b2Married + b3Children + b4Husband's Housework + b5 (Female x Married) 
+ b6 (Female x Children) + b7 (Female x Husband's Housework) + x , b , ~ ; ,  
where the X, are industry, state, occupation, part-time, education, and age. 
Gender gap = 1 minus the antilog of the coefficient. This gap is evaluated at specific values of the interactive terms. For example, the gender gap in the United States 
for married people (married = 1) with children (children = 1) in inegalitarian households (husband's housework = 10) is: 
1 - exp [(-.46) + (-.32) + (.21) + (.009 x lo)] = 1 - exp (-.48) = 1L.62 = .38. 
Inegalitarian households are defined as those in which husbands do 10 percent of housework. 

Egalitarian households are defined as those in which husbands do 40 percent of housework. 

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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two countries, as the percentage of house- 
work done by their husbands increases, the 
likelihood of their having workplace author- 
ity also increases. Only in Canada, however, 
does this interaction term generate a substan- 
tively large effect on the gender gap in au- 
thority: The gender gap in authority for mar- 
ried women without children in the home liv- 
ing in a relatively egalitarian household (a 
household in which husbands do 40 percent 
of the housework) is .23, whereas the gap for 
married women with children in the home 
living in an inegalitarian household (in which 
husbands do only 10 percent of the house- 
work) is .82. This figure is comparable to the 
gender gap in Sweden and Norway. We have 
no explanation for why the patterns in 
Canada are different from those in the other 
countries. For Canada, therefore, these inter- 
actions are consistent with the self-selection 
hypothesis that women with high levels of 
domestic responsibilities often select them- 
selves out of the running for positions of au- 
thority.14 There is little or no support for the 
self-selection hypothesis for the other coun- 
tries in the study. 
The Gender Gap in the Amount of 
Authority 
So far we have only discussed the differen- 
tial likelihood of men and women having any 
authority, but not differences in the amount 
of authority they have. We now examine gen- 
der differences in the amount of authority in 
two ways: (1) by estimating cumulative 
logits (equation 4) with the 10-point amount- 
of-authority scale as the dependent variable, 
and (2) by looking at the amount of author- 
ity conditional upon having some authority. 
nificantly higher likelihood of havi,ng authority 
than do single men in these countries. When age 
is added as a compositional control to Model 5, 
the coefficient for the married x female interac- 
tion term is considerably reduced and ceases to 
be statistically significant in Norway. 
l 4  Although these results lend support to the 
self-selection hypothesis for Canada, and to a 
lesser extent for Norway, the negative association 
between housework inequality and women's 
workplace authority in Canada and Norway could 
partially reflect a causal impact of authority on 
housework rather than of housework on the like- 
lihood of getting authority. 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the patterns of 
gender gaps for the amount-of-authority 
scale are generally quite similar to those for 
the dichotomous authority variables. As in 
the analysis of having authority, the addition 
of the compositional variables has, at best, a 
modest effect on the gender gap. Also, the 
rank order of countries according to the gen- 
der gap on the amount-of-authority scale is 
almost identical to their rank order on the 
odds of having authority. 
To evaluate the glass-ceiling hypothesis, 
we restrict the analysis to respondents in the 
authority hierarchy and then examine gender 
gaps in authority within this subsample. We 
use the respondent's formal position in the 
authority hierarchy as the criterion for re- 
stricting the sample: All respondents who say 
that they are at least a supervisor are treated 
as in the authority hierarchy. On this re- 
stricted sample, we run Model 1 and Model 
2 for two dependent variables-sanctioning 
authority, and middle-manager or above in 
the formal hierarchy-and Model 2 for the 
amount-of-authority scale as we11.15 The re- 
sults are presented in Table 7. 
The most striking result in Table 7 is the 
sharp difference between the United States 
and other countries. In all countries except 
the United States, the gender gap in sanction- 
ing authority, hierarchical position, and the 
amount of authority remain large and statis- 
tically significant when we restrict the 
sample to people in the authority hierarchy 
for both Model 1 and Model 2.16 In contrast, 
in the United States, the gender gap ceases 
to be statistically significant for all of the de- 
pendent variables in both models. This is not 
because the standard errors of the coeffi- 
cients for gender are large in the United 
States, but because the absolute value of the 
coefficients are relatively small. On the basis 
of these data, in the United States the net 
gender gap in sanctioning authority among 
l 5  Again, the decision-making variable seems 
to be a weaker indicator of real authority than our 
other measures. We therefore do not include de- 
cision-making in the analysis of the glass-ceiling 
hypothesis. 
l 6  In the analysis of the decision-making depen- 
dent variable (not shown), the gender gaps for the 
United Kingdom and Norway also cease to be sta- 
tistically significant in the model with compo- 
sitional controls. 
Table 7. Testing the Glass Ceiling Hypothesis: Logistic Coefficient for Gender for Regressions Predicting Odds of Women Having Work Authority Relative to 
Men: Seven Countries, Sample Restricted to People in the Formal Hierarchy 
Model 1 (Model with No Controls) Model 2 (Model with Controls) 
Middle Manager Middle Manager Amount of 
Sanctioning or Above in Sanctioning or Above in Authority 
Authority Formal Hierarchy Authority Formal Hierarchy Scale 
Gross Gross Net Net Net 
Logistic Gender Logistic Gender Logistic Gender Logistic Gender Logistic Gender 
CountrylN Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap Coefficient Gap 
United States -.32 .27 -.27 .23 -.08 .08 -.36 .30 -.28 .24 
N =373" (.23) (.23) (.27) (.28) (.23) 
Australia -.918 .60 -.75* .53 -.65* .48 -.55* .42 -.64* .47 
N = 414 (.21) (.23) ~ 2 5 )  ~ 2 7 )  (.21) 
United Kingdom -1.01' .63 -1.31' .73 -.808 .55 -1.08' .66 -1.03' .64 
N = 332 (.25) (.33) (.31) (.39) ~ 2 7 )  
Canada -.67* .49 -.66* .48 -.44 .35 -.71* .51 -.72* .51 
N = 398 (.22) (.24) (.26) ( 3 )  (.23) 
Sweden -.88* .58 -.82* .56 -.61 .46 -.91* .60 -.91* .60 
N = 248 (.31) (.37) (.36) (.43) (.32) 
Norway -1.27' .72 -.90* .59 -.93* .61 -.98* .63 -1.06' .65 
N = 376 (.31) (.33) (.35) (.38) (.30) 
Japan -2.29* .90 n a b  1.00 -2.37 .91 n.a. 1.00 -1.21' .70 
N =  125 (1.11) (1.26) (1.05) 
"The N's reported here are from the sanctioning authority model. N's for the other models may differ slightly. 
There are no women in middle management positions or above in the Japanese sample. Thus, we assume women's odds of having authority relative to men are close 
to zero. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
people in the authority hierarchy is only 
about .08 (i.e., the odds of a woman in the 
hierarchy having sanctioning authority are 
about 8 percent less than those of a man, af- 
ter controlling for the compositional vari- 
ables in the equation); the gender gap for be- 
ing at least a middle manager is only .30, and 
the gender gap for the amount of authority is 
.24. In other countries, the gender gaps in 
authority conditional on being in the author- 
ity hierarchy are generally .50 and above.17 
What do these results mean for the glass- 
ceiling hypothesis? The glass-ceiling hypoth- 
esis states that the barriers women face, rela- 
tive to men, for promotions up the authority 
hierarchy are generally greater than the bar- 
riers they face getting into the hierarchy it- 
self. If this hypothesis is correct, then the 
gender gap in authority should be greater for 
people already in the authority hierarchy 
(Table 7) than for people in the labor force 
as a whole (Table 5). With only two excep- 
tions, the coefficients are not consistent with 
this prediction. In every country, for sanc- 
tioning authority and for the amount-of-au- 
thority scale, the coefficients for gender for 
people in the hierarchy are the same as or 
smaller than the coefficients for gender for 
the sample as whole. The only cases in which 
the results are in line with the expectations 
of the glass-ceiling hypothesis are for formal 
position in the hierarchy in the United King- 
dom and Australia.I8 With these possible ex- 
Because of the small sample size in these 
analyses, we cannot to test the differences be- 
tween the coefficients for the United States and 
each of the other countries taken separately. If we 
compare the United States to all of the other 
countries taken together except for Japan (Japan 
was dropped because it has such large standard 
errors), then we find that in Model 1 for sanction- 
ing authority the coefficient for the United States 
is .43 smaller than that for the other countries 
combined (p < .08), and the coefficient in the 
United States for being a middle manager or 
above in the formal hierarchy is .54 smaller than 
that in other countries (17 < .02). In the parallel 
results for Model 2,  the magnitude of the differ- 
ences in coefficients is virtually the same, but the 
standard errors increase so the significance level 
drops t o p  < .13. 
For those people already in the hierarchy, the 
odds of a woman being at least a middle manager 
are 66 percent less than those for men in the 
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ceptions, therefore, these results do not sup- 
port the glass-ceiling hypothesis. Especially 
in the United States, once women are in the 
authority hierarchy, the barriers to promo- 
tions they face relative to men (at least into 
the middle range of the hierarchy) are not 
greater than the barriers they face getting 
into the hierarchy in the first place; if any- 
thing, these barriers appear to be weaker. 
These results do not demonstrate that there 
is no gender discrimination in promotions for 
people already in authority hierarchies. How- 
ever, the glass-ceiling hypothesis is not sim- 
ply a claim about the existence of discrimi- 
nation within hierarchies; it claims that such 
discrimination increases as one moves up the 
hierarchy, and the comparative data we have 
reviewed do not support this view. Of course, 
these data do  not speak to the issue of 
whether there is a significant glass ceiling at 
the highest levels of authority hierarchies in 
the largest firms. In a random sample of this 
sort we do not have sufficient data on CEO's 
or top executives of large corporations to ex- 
amine whether intensified barriers exist at 
the top of hierarchies.'' Nevertheless, while 
a gender gap in the amount of authority 
among people in the authority hierarchy 
probably exists in the United States, our data 
indicate that it is weaker than it is in other 
countries in this study and cannot properly 
be described as constituting a glass ceiling, 
at least in the middle ranges of most organi- 
zational hierarchies. 
United Kingdom and 42 percent less than those 
for men in Australia, whereas the odds  of a 
woman simply being in the hierarchy are only 44 
percent less than those for men in the United 
Kingdom and 35 percent less than those for men 
in Australia. 
'"he formal hierarchy item does distinguish 
between top and upper managers,  on  the one 
hand, and middle managers, on  the other,  al- 
though the number of cases is so small that in 
most countries we cannot make reliable estimates 
of the gender gap in authority at this level of the 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the same basic pattern 
occurs using top manager or upper manager as the 
dependent variable: In the United States, the gen- 
der gap for being an upper manager or top man- 
ager, conditional upon being in the authority hi- 
erarchy, is about .25, whereas in other countries 
the figures are all between .47 and .67. 
THE GENDER GAP IN AUTHORITY 
Explaining Cross-National Variation 
We have rejected the possibility that the dif- 
ferences across countries in the gender gap 
in workplace authority can be attributed to 
differences in various compositional factors. 
We now explore somewhat less formally sev- 
eral general macrosocial and cultural factors 
that may help explain the variation across 
countries in the gender gap. The results are 
presented in Table 8. 
Gender ideology. Respondents were asked 
whether they strongly agreed, somewhat 
agreed, somewhat disagreed, or strongly dis- 
agreed with each of the following statements: 
(1) Ideally, there should be as many women 
as men in important positions in government 
and business; (2) If both husband and wife 
work, they should share equally in the house- 
work and childcare; (3) It is better for the 
family if the husband is the principal bread- 
winner outside the home and the wife has 
primary responsibility for the home and chil- 
dren. A gender-ideology scale was con-
structed by adding the responses to each item 
and averaging the responses over the number 
of valid items. The last item was rescaled so 
that the egalitarian response was in the same 
direction as the responses on the other two 
questions. The scale ranges from 1, indicat- 
ing a consistently strong egalitarian attitude 
toward gender roles, to 4, indicating a con- 
sistently strong conservative attitude. 
In Table 8, there is no relationship between 
the rank order of countries in terms of gender 
ideology (column 2) and the rank order for 
the gender gap in workplace authority (col- 
umn 1). Sweden and Norway are the most 
ideologically egalitarian but have among the 
largest gender gaps in authority; the United 
States is exceeded only by Japan in the level 
of ideological inegalitarianism, yet it has the 
smallest gender gap in authority. 
Sexual and reproductive rights. Charles 
(1992) has constructed an index of legally- 
enforced gender rights based on a principal 
components analysis, single-factor solution 
of three dummy variables: (1) abortions are 
available on request; (2) marital rape is a 
crime; and (3) women are guaranteed at least 
12 weeks of paid pregnancy leave from work. 
Positive scores indicate more rights. Scale 
values for our countries range from 1.83 to 
-1.02. However, there is little relationship be- 
tween the country rank order on these scale 
scores (column 3) and the rank order for the 
net gender gap for the authority dichotomy. 
Gender gap in earnings. The gender gap 
in earnings may indicate broader institutional 
arrangements for gender equality within 
work, and thus one might expect it to be 
linked to the gender gap in authority. Con- 
trary to this expectation, however, the data in 
Table 8 indicate no association between the 
gender gap in hourly earnings (column 4) 
and the gender gap in authority (column 1).20 
Occupational sex segregation. The expec- 
tation that the rank order of countries on sex- 
segregation of occupations should roughly 
mirror the gender gap in authority is not 
strongly supported by the available data. 
Based on measures from two comparative 
studies of occupational sex segregation (Blau 
and Ferber 1990; Charles 1992), there is 
little relationship between occupational sex 
segregation (columns 5 and 6) and the gen- 
der gap in authority. Japan has among the 
lowest levels of occupational sex segregation 
while, depending on the measure of sex seg- 
regation, the United Kingdom and Australia 
have among the highest levels of occupa- 
tional sex segregation. The measures of oc- 
cupational sex segregation used in these two 
studies are based on quite broad classifica- 
tions of occupations-seven categories in the 
Blau and Ferber study and six in the Charles 
study. A more fine-grained analysis of occu- 
pational sex segregation could alter these re- 
sults. However, Brinton and Ngo (1991) 
found that even with an 89-category classifi- 
cation, the United States has a higher index 
of dissimilarity than Japan (55.6 compared to 
49.8).21 Thus, it seems unlikely that a more 
20The data for Sweden, Norway, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States 
are from National Committee on Pay Equity 
(1988:lO-14). Data for Japan come from the In- 
ternational Labor Organization (1992:798-804). 
There are some differences in the dates and defi- 
nitions for each country: Australia (1985), full- 
time, average weekly earnings; Canada (1986), 
not specified; Japan (1984), average monthly 
earnings; Norway (1980), average hourly earn- 
ings in manufacturing; Sweden (1985), average 
monthly earnings, industry; United Kingdom 
(198.3, average hourly earnings; United States 
(1987), median annual earnings. 
21 Brinton and Ngo (1991) demonstrated that 
the lower occupational sex-segregation in Japan 
Table 8. Gender Gap in Authority and Selected Macrosocial Characteristics: Seven Countries 
Occupational Sex Segregation 
Net Gender Gap on Gender Sexual and Gender Gap Percentage of 
Authority Dicho- Ideology Reproductive ~n Index of Labor Force in OPfficial 
tomy (Model 2) Scoreb Rights' Earningsd Dissimilarity Ratio Index Managerial Positionsg 
Women's Percentage 
Rank Net Rank Rank Rank Wage Rate Rank Rank Rank of 
Order of Gender Order of Mean Order of Mean Order of as % of Order of Mean Order of Mean Order of Labor 
Countries Gapa Countries Score Countries Score Countries Men's Countries Scoree Countries Scoref Countries Force 
U.S.A. .36 Sweden 1.77 Norway 1.83 Sweden 91.0 Japan 22.2 U.S.A. .65 Australia 15.8% 
Australia .45 Norway 1.82 Sweden 1.17 Norway 81.9 Australia 3 1.9 Japan .72 U.S.A. 13.7% 
U.K. .50 Canada 2.01 U.S.A. 1.17 Australia 81.7 U.S.A. 36.6 Canada .75 Canada 12.2% 
Canada .58 Australia 2.05 Canada -.48 U.K. 74.0 Canada 41.0 U.K. .92 U.K. 12.2% 
Sweden .79 U.S.A. 2.17 U.K. -.48 Canada 66.0 Sweden 41.8 Australia .95 Sweden 10.9% 
Norway .82 Japan 2.43 Australia -1.02 U.S.A. 65.0 U.K. 44.4 Sweden .96 Norway 10.4% 
Japan .98 Japan -1.02 Japan 51.8 Norway 47.2 Norway .99 Japan 5.9% 
"The Gender Gap in workplace authority is defined as 1 - exp(b), where b is the coefficient for gender in the logistic regression predicting the authority dichotomy in 
Model 2. 
This is a simple index based on three Likert items concerning sex role attitudes. The lower the score the more egalitarian. The scores range from 1 to 4. Data were not 
available for the United Kingdom. 
"This is a simple factor analytic scale of three legal rights for women: rights to abortion, rights to at least 12 weeks paid pregnancy leave, marital rape is a crime 
(Charles 1992: 491-2). 
See footnote 20 for sources and definitions of measures. 
Y e e  Blau and Ferber (1990). 
'"Ratio index of sex segregation" scores calculated by Charles (1992:489). 
g People in jobs that are described as "managerial positions" (not merely supervisory positions) in the formal hierarchy variable. 
THE GENDER GAP IN AUTHORITY 
refined analysis would support the view that 
variations across countries in the gender gap 
in authority is simply a reflection of varia- 
tion in broader processes in the association 
between gender and occupation. 
The percent of the labor force with au- 
thority. Column 7 presents the rank-ordering 
of the countries in our sample by the percent- 
age of the labor force in managerial positions 
(as measured by the formal hierarchy vari- 
able). The results indicate that the relative 
size of the managerial category in a country 
is closely related to the rank ordering of the 
gender gap in authority: The four English- 
speaking countries have the largest percent- 
age of their labor forces in managerial posi- 
tions, followed by the two Scandinavian 
countries, and then, with a much smaller fig- 
ure, Japan.22 It therefore appears that the ag- 
gregate availability of managerial positions 
in a society may influence the size of the 
gender gap in the allocation of authority. 
The women's movement and political cul- 
ture. We know of no comparative research 
that systematically assesses women's move- 
ments in different countries in terms of their 
organizational strength, political strength, or 
their ideological stance. Our analysis of 
these issues, therefore, must remain rela- 
tively impressionistic. 
In terms of the political strength of the 
compared to the United States occurs because 
there is lower sex segregation among low-status 
occupations in Japan as compared to the United 
States. Among high status occupations, in con- 
trast, the level of sex segregation is higher in Ja- 
pan than in the United States. They proposed an 
alternative measure that weights the index of dis- 
similarity by the prestige of occupations. This 
weighting procedure considerably increases the 
index of dissimilarity for Japan and modestly re- 
duces it for the United States. The result is that 
the prestige-adjusted occupational sex segrega- 
tion index in Japan is higher than it is in the 
United States. 
22 When the category "managers" is defined as 
people who occupy either manager or supervisor 
positions in the formal hierarchy variable, or 
when it is defined on the basis of the other two 
dimensions of authority we have been examining 
(decision-making and sanctioning authority), then 
the rank-ordering of the proportion of the labor 
force who are managers does not correspond so 
neatly to the rank ordering of the gender gap in 
authority. 
women's movement, the women's movement 
in Japan is clearly far weaker than that in any 
other country. It is less obvious how to judge 
the relative strength of women's movements 
in the other six countries, although it seems 
clear that the politically organized women's 
movement in the United States would be 
among the strongest. According to Katzen- 
stein (1987): "Mainstream feminism in the 
United States, liberal in its political tenets, is 
the only movement of those described in this 
volume with a mass-based national organiza- 
tion run by a paid, professional staff. In no 
country in Western Europe is there a national 
organization analogous to the National Orga- 
nization for Women (NOW)" (p. 12).23 She 
further noted that although feminist con- 
sciousness in Sweden is fairly highly dif- 
fused in the population (in contrast to Brit- 
ain, where she felt it is less developed) and 
has had a major impact on the social policies 
of the Swedish Social Democratic welfare 
state: "In Sweden policy success is won at 
the price of organizational weakness [of the 
women's movement]" (Katzenstein 1987: 
16). This image of a relatively weakly mobi- 
lized women's movement in Sweden is ech- 
oed by Ruggie (1988), who wrote: "Swedish 
women themselves are not greatly mobilized 
for change at present, either in autonomous 
groups or in workplace organizations" (p. 
187). While this evidence is impressionistic, 
it seems safe to say that the politically orga- 
nized women's movement is probably weak- 
est in Japan and strongest in the United 
States, with the other countries falling some- 
where in between. 
The broad ideological orientation of differ- 
ent women's movements is somewhat easier 
to judge, at least if we are willing to assume 
that these women's movements probably re- 
flect to a significant extent the broader po- 
litical culture of their societies. Esping- 
Anderson (1990) classified capitalist democ- 
racies along several dimensions characteriz- 
ing the ideological principles within their 
welfare states. The "decommodification" 
score measures the extent to which the state 
neutralizes the effects of the market through 
welfare policies (Esping-Anderson 1990:52). 
23 The volume discusses the women's move-
ments in the United States, Britain, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, France, Italy, and Germany. 
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Table 9. Scores on Three Indicators of Political Culture: Seven Countries 
Degree of 
"Decommodification" 
in the Welfare State 
Rank Order Score 
Australia 13.0 
United States 13.8 
Canada 22.0 
United Kingdom 23.4 
Japan 27.1 
Norway 38.3 
Sweden 39.1 
Degree of Liberalism 
in Regime Attributes 
Rank Order 
United States 

Canada 

Australia 

Japan 

United Kingdom 

Norway 

Sweden 

Score 
12 
12 
10 
10 
6 
0 
0 
Degree of Socialism 
in Regime Attributes 
Rank Order Score 
United States 0 
Japan 2 
Australia 4 
United Kingdom 4 
Canada 4 
Norway 8 
Sweden 8 
Source: From Esping-Anderson (1990). "Decommodification" is a measure of the extent to which the 
welfare state neutralizes the effects of the market through its welfare policies. "Liberalism" indexes the 
extent to which the welfare state interventions follow the principles of classical liberalism. "Socialism" 
indexes the extent to which the regime follows socialist principles. 
The "liberalism" score indexes the extent to 
which welfare-state interventions follow the 
principles of classical liberalism, while the 
"socialism" score indexes the extent to which 
the regime follows socialist principles 
(Esping-Anderson 1990:74). These scores 
are presented in Table 9. With the exception 
of Japan, the rank orderings of these politi- 
cal variables closely parallel the rank order- 
ing of the gender gap. Specifically, the four 
English-speaking countries score low on 
what Esping-Anderson terms "decommod- 
ification" (i.e., welfare state policies which 
reduce the dependency of workers on the 
market) and high on liberalism, whereas Nor- 
way and Sweden score high on decom-
modification and extremely low on liberal- 
ism. 
How does this relate to the problem of the 
gender gap in authority? Liberalism argues 
that markets are a legitimate and efficient 
means of distributing welfare as long as they 
are "fair." Eliminating ascriptive barriers to 
individual achievement in labor markets and 
employment relations is therefore a central 
objective of liberal politics. A women's 
movement animated by a liberal political cul- 
ture, therefore, would be particularly con-
cerned with equal rights and the elimination 
of such barriers. In keeping with this expec- 
tation, Goldberg and Uremen (1990:28-30) 
emphasized the relatively strong antidis- 
crimination laws that have been passed in the 
United States and their relative effectiveness, 
at least as compared to many other countries. 
Social democracy, in contrast, questions 
the legitimacy of market-determined in- 
equalities regardless of the equality of oppor- 
tunity, and seeks to render human welfare at 
least partially independent of market mecha- 
nisms. A women's movement embedded in a 
social democratic political culture would be 
expected to be less concerned with labor 
market mechanisms and more concerned 
with state interventions that directly provide 
services and resources that enhance women's 
welfare like parental leave, maternal health 
care, childcare services, and child allowances 
(Moen 1989; Goldberg and Uremen 1990: 
141-44). Such priorities would not directly 
affect discrimination in the workplace. Com- 
menting on the contrast between American 
liberal feminism and European social demo- 
cratic feminism, Fraser (1993) argued that 
Americans adopt a "universal breadwinner" 
model of gender equality that emphasizes 
employment rights, whereas European social 
democrats adopt a "caregiver parity" model 
that stresses the provision of services and re- 
sources to equalize the conditions of life for 
women engaged primarily in domestic re- 
sponsibilities. Furthermore, there are unin- 
tended by-products of some of the social 
democratic provisions for caregiver parity 
that might even increase the gender gap in 
authority. For example, women are much 
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more likely than are men to take advantage 
of the generous provision of parental leave 
on the birth of children. The real costs to an 
employer of paid parental leaves are likely 
to be much greater when these leaves are 
taken by managerial employees than by non- 
managerial employees, since an extended ab- 
sence of a manager is likely to be organiza- 
tionally disruptive. This means that since 
women take parental leaves much more fre- 
quently than do men, employers are likely to 
engage in statistical discrimination against 
women in managerial promotions. The rela- 
tively large gender gap in workplace author- 
ity in the social democratic Scandinavian 
countries, therefore, may be in part a by- 
product of the relatively low priority placed 
on liberal goals of individual competition 
and achievement relative to more communal 
benefits, and in part the unintended effects 
of these communal benefits on employer dis- 
incentives to promote women into manage- 
rial positions. 
Taking these arguments together, we hy- 
pothesize that the variation across countries 
in the size of the gender gap in workplace 
authority is the result of the interaction be- 
tween the relative abundance of authority po- 
sitions and the capacity and interest of a po- 
litically organized women's movement to 
challenge the barriers to women being pro- 
moted into those positions. If there are rela- 
tively few managerial positions and the 
women's movement is particularly weak, as 
in Japan, the gender gap in authority will be 
large. If there are moderate numbers of 
managerial positions, but the women's move- 
ment is oriented toward collective goods and 
decommodified social provisions, the gender 
gap will also be relatively large. If there are 
relatively many managerial positions in the 
job structure and the women's movement is 
relatively strong and oriented toward liberal 
individualist goals, the gender gap will be 
most effectively challenged. 
CONCLUSION 
Several general conclusions emerge from this 
research. First, although a gender gap in au- 
thority exists in all of the countries we stud- 
ied, there is considerable cross-national 
variation in the magnitude of this gap: It is 
smaller in the English-speaking countries, 
especially the United States and Australia, 
relatively large in the Scandinavian coun- 
tries, and huge in Japan. These results appear 
robust across a variety of measures. 
Second, the gender gap in authority within 
countries and the patterns of cross-national 
variation do not appear to be the result of 
compositional differences among men and 
women in the labor force: After controlling 
for a range of attributes of firms, jobs, and 
individuals, the gender gap for every country 
and the basic pattern of cross-national differ- 
ences remain. This suggests that a significant 
proportion of the differences in men's and 
women's attainment of authority is probably 
attributable to direct discrimination. 
Although some of the gender gap in au- 
thority in some countries (especially Canada) 
may be a result of self-selection by women, 
our analysis does not support the view that 
this is a major determinant of gender in- 
equality in authority, and it appears to be of 
relatively small importance in most of the 
countries we studied. 
Third, the somewhat weak form of the 
glass-ceiling hypothesis we investigated is 
not supported in most of the countries in the 
study. Although a gender gap in authority 
continues to exist when we restrict the analy- 
sis to people already in the authority hierar- 
chy, this gap does not appear to be greater 
than the gap in acquiring authority in the first 
place. The common view that the women's 
movement has been more successful in open- 
ing up positions for women at the bottom of 
the organizational hierarchy than in remov- 
ing barriers to their movement up the corpo- 
rate ladder is not supported by these data. 
With respect to the differences among coun- 
tries on this issue, in the United States pro- 
motional possibilities for women already in 
the authority hierarchy appear to be signifi- 
cantly greater than those in any of the other 
countries in the study. While in many other 
respects the United States is far from being a 
leader in egalitarian policies, on gender is- 
sues in workplace hierarchies, the United 
States has made considerable progress rela- 
tive to most other countries. 
Finally, and more tentatively, our data sug- 
gest that variation in the gender gap across 
countries may be the result of the interaction 
between variations in the relative abundance 
of authority positions and the effectiveness 
of different women's movements in challeng- 
ing the barriers women face in moving into 
those positions. Both political and economic 
factors thus seem to b e  important in explain- 
ing  t h e  variability in gender  inequality in  
workplace authority, whereas cultural differ- 
ences more specifically linked to gender ide- 
ology seem less significant. 
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